The recent mistakes the NCAA made in its Miami investigation
called forth a predictable firestorm from the media mavens who make a career
out of attacking the NCAA. I think it is overblown and think we should examine
the Miami case in a wider context of the issues facing any self-governing
professional association. This means we can admit the mistakes but also see why
they occur, how they can be corrected. This approach does not require NCAA
conspiracy or corruption. The report that NCAA commissioned from an outside law
firm does a good job assessing the legal and institutional issues. The report reveals
the NCAA as a reasonably competent, harried and generally effective
self-governing group.
The wedding of sports and universities occurred as a
philosophical plan and historical accident. 19th century
universities saw athletics as a natural extension of a classical education. Student
athletes ran the early college teams. Very quickly teams took on outsize importance
for alumni and school identity. By the 1870s teams were hiring ringers and
nonstudents to play. Football ended up such a violent and important sport that
when 13 athletes died in one year, President Roosevelt threatened national
intervention. Colleges resorted to the classic American solution of a
self-governing association to oversee sports. The NCAA grew slowly and
awkwardly into a membership association with 1066 members trying to control the
unwieldy and volatile world they inherited, spend money on, benefit from and
barely control.
Self-regulating membership associations like the NCAA establish
jurisdictional control over standards, membership and accreditation. Engineering,
social work, medicine, law, construction and thousands of American enterprises
depend upon professionals setting standards for membership and enforcing their
existence.
The irony is that the media seldom worries about when
doctors kill patients or or engineers design flawed buildings. The stakes in
these self-governing professions are far higher than sports but largely
ignored. These associations have elaborate systems of self-governance to ensure
competent performance and reasonable competition. Professional associations
police their own and have investigative and adjudicative procedures for sanctions.
American self-governing professionalism developed as a
counterpoint to government control. Education remains no different with
colleges subject to review by certifying professional organizations. When
professional regulation fails, decisions may end up in the courts or before
legislatures.
My point is the NCAA successes and failures are not unusual
and reflect normal American practice with voluntary associations setting and
enforcing standards.
Successful self-regulation requires member organizations
internalize regulated standards. Most professional institutions will have
inside compliance staff to help avoid pitfalls and keep standards. In major
cases, the organizations might call in outside counsel or compliance experts.
The NCAA reflects this practice where local college
compliance staffs work daily with central NCAA enforcement staff. As a
professional association NCAA members have strong “affirmative obligations” to
internally police and self-report violations.
The NCAA makes its fair of mistakes. I have direct experience
of how UW and NCAA lost a major case against Rick Neuheisel when the NCAA
forgot to follow new protocols. They are not perfect, but not fundamentally
different from most self-regulating associations hampered by lack of subpoena
power and facing incentives to hide information.
The report by Cadwalader Taft report on the NCAA performance
in the Miami case exposes a reasonably competent and committed professionals. The
report highlights the tensions between field investigation and internal legal
accountability. The mistakes reflect the strain between the push to get the
information and the legal constraints upon any investigation.
The NCAA faces the same problem all nongovernmental
self-regulating groups face—not having subpoena power. Its members legislate
rules, and members accept an affirmative
obligation to report violations and cooperate with investigations. The vast
majority of schools honor this obligation. Affirmative obligation and mutual
trust are fundamental to self-governing professional associations such as the
NCAA.
However, people lie.
Let me repeat, people lie, withhold information and misdirect.
People with high career stakes have incentives to lie. Miami
coaches lied, mislead or withheld. Ohio State lied. North Carolina lied. Florida
State lied. Michigan mislead. USC withheld and mislead. Head coaches claim
convenient ignorance of the activities of their assistant coaches. New NCAA laws
impose absolute accountability on head coaches so they could not slough off
responsibility on assistants while benefitting from cheating.
The Miami report reveals that the NCAA investigators often piggy-back
on other investigations to maximize capacity to get information. The NCAA
investigators have limited budgets and need standard bureaucratic approval.
Doubling up extends budgets and helps the NCAA get information they cannot find
for lack of subpoena power.
All professional associations double up with formal
investigations if they can. The Miami report explained that the NCAA had strong
internal limitations upon how it can acquire information. Investigators are
prohibited from sting operations or lying to elicit testimony. These are court-sanctioned
activities but report makes clear that the NCAA takes limits seriously.
The NCAA internal process worked to a point. The investigator
Mr. Ameen Najeer found third parties would not talk with him and hit upon what
he regarded as an ingenious solution. He could double up on depositions taken
by Mr. Shapiro’s defense lawyer over bankruptcy.
Mr. Najeer reported the idea to his superiors. They
discussed it with the Executive Vice President Jim Isch to get authorization
for budgets. The need for budgetary approval flows through the report
emphasizing the NCAA like everyone else has resource limits and accountability
issues. The compliance leaders also sought legal clearance.
This request for a legal opinion should reinforce confidence
in the internal process and integrity. The head lawyer mentioned two basic
issues. First, the use of outside counsel required approval and reporting to
legal office. Second, the legal counsel argued that Najeer’s approach violated
internal rules. Counsel opinion nixed the approach. The investigator’s
superiors supported this and refused the request.
Up to this point the organization functioned on point. Najeer,
however, developed a “work around,” but did not inform his superiors nor get
budget authorization. This meant that Perez did conduct depositions for
bankruptcy that she shared with the Najeer. This information helped shaped the
NCAA bill of charges.
The report correctly faults the internal leadership for not
following up on the investigator’s actions and not monitoring more tightly. When
the NCAA discovered what Najeer had done, it eliminated the “tainted”
information, notified Miami and revised the charges.
The report illuminates how hard investigations are without
subpoena and when people with affirmative obligations choose to lie and withhold.
We should not forget, that Miami President Shalala’s protestations aside, Miami
has created a failed athletic culture with three major implosions in 15 years.
The report makes clear how vital confidentiality remains during an
investigation.
Good self-regulation requires internal legitimacy,
affirmative obligations to cooperate, a responsible rule making process, and strong
compliance and consulting programs. These need to be reinforced by a system of
investigation and adjudication that is both professional, legally accountable
and adjudicators that possess peer legitimacy and expertise but also have some
claim to impartiality and fairness.
I think the NCAA
process is basically intact and responsible especially in its daily work. It’s
major investigations reveal the need for a more professionalized and
accountable investigative arm. Moreover, the NCAA faces serious issues with
excessive rule making as well as issues of how to ensure consistency across
decisions made by the compliance committees. This is not conspiracy or
corruption, it is the reality of self-regulation.