Showing posts with label Penn State. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Penn State. Show all posts

Sunday, July 22, 2012

Penn State & the NCAA: Restorative Justice, not the Death Penalty


The NCAA Will Act on Penn State & Should Seek Restorative Justice not the Death Penalty
People are demanding the NCAA to act against Penn State for its moral horror show in the Sandusky affair. I think the NCAA will act but am not sure it should. But if it does, it should act to restore justice, not impose retribution.


The NCAA is a confederated membership nonprofit organization with complex bylaws that grant immense autonomy to campuses and conferences. It is not a state actor and schools have jealously limited its power.

The bylaws resolutely stick to issues around equal playing, sports governance, athlete welfare and amateurism. The bylaws define legal not moral requirements of membership. The academic institutions jealously guard local prerogatives and resist reforms that centralize power. Athletic directors and coaches along with the media hate NCAA enforcement. None of them want an ethics police.

Acting now against Penn State “for the good of intercollegiate sports” would involve an unprecedented assertion of power by the NCAA. The claim would be that Penn State as an institution and football team failed in their institutional control. Penn State failed but it is not clear it involved NCAA bylaws.

Here are the reasons for caution:
  1.  1t is not clear any major NCAA bylaws were actually violated. The NCAA has no morals clauses; it does have clear moral ideals in its governing documents. Most “morals” violations such as sexual harassment or substance abuse remain at campus level and violate campus rules and state law. The NCAA seldom gets involved as an ethics politice unless it involves institutional dereliction and student welfare. Penn State is not about student welfare.
  2.  Mark Emmert has pointed out the NCAA has no precedent, the actions are “unprecedented.” He has made clear the NCAA should not be bound by the past “normal” expectations. The NCAA issues thousands of punishments as regular administrative actions on minor violations such as practice or travel times violations. These rulings occur around complex rules to protect student athletes and ensure some fair play. Even major violations involve two separate issues.
    1. they entail a clear and proven major violation such as impermissible benefits or agent contact or illegal recruiting. None of these activities remotely relate to ignoring or covering up the abuse of children by a former coach.
    2.  the most serious infractions involve loss of institutional control and deliberate cover up. Penn State qualifies in spades. But it is not clear the leaders even worried whether these were NCAA violations. They were trying to protect their institution’s reputation, not hide from the NCAA.
  3.  NCAA infractions investigators are not equipped to examine criminal actions and must defer to criminal investigations. NCAA personnel have neither training nor writ in these areas.
  4.  The case involves hard issues of statute of limitations for most NCAA violations. The abuse probably began before 1977 (35 years ago) and Sandusky retired in 1999. He had a privileged Emeritus status for the last 13 years, but no formal employment relationship.
  5.   Mike McQueary, a graduate assistant, reported seeing Sandusky sexually assaulting a boy in the shower room in 2002. From that point the Head Coach and senior university administrators, not just athletic personnel, covered up for decade. While the Freeh report makes clear a cover-up occurred, most of the time no one even bothered to think about it. If the NCAA has a case it exists here in the cover-up and institutional failure.
“Hard cases make bad law” is a basic maxim of American judiciary action. This is a very hard case that could make very bad law.

If the infractions committee or NCAA President acted now, they would appropriate a range of control over over ranges of moral/legal behavior that lie beyond their past competence or mandate. I think they will act simply because the actions are so despicable even if beyond any legal writ. It looks like the actions were “enabled or at least not stopped” in Mark Emmert’s words

The NCAA will act. Paradoxically they will act for the same reasons that drove the cover-up to protect the legitimacy and credibility of the NCAA and out of moral outrage.

The NCAA lawyers will concoct justifications based upon good of the sport or generalized duties of ethics and integrity in athletics. This logic will expand the authority of the NCAA and set huge precedents to regulate new areas.

The NCAA will also act because people fear that that if they don't, no one else will. They cannot rely on Penn State.

This is a school whose idea of restitution is to paint out halos over Paterno’s head and redo their bathrooms!! They finally will take the statue down. Come on! Everyone who can be fired has been, and the Regents should resign and have started but what else do we expect. Sandusky has gone to jail and other will be tried. Penn State will not fall on its sword.

The senior administrators of Penn State and their coach failed to exercise moral integrity and act against immoral and illegal behavior. They worried more about their institution and careers than the victims. This is the crux of the NCAA case of not exercising institutional control over actions occurring by non-university employees that administrators missed and ignored when revealed.

These are real criminal and civil crimes and moral failures. But it is not clear they violate NCAA bylaws.

Let’s assume the NCAA will act with a newly developed warrant asserting new powers and authority based upon moral integrity of institutional systems. Let's assume they act through Presidential action from the Board and bypass the infractions committee. Now let us assume that the program does not have a history of violations or probation that would point to long-term lack of institutional control. Multiple probations also point to an inability or unwillingness to gain control of rogue coaches, rogue agents, rogue players or rogue boosters like. At Penn State no extant history of violations or institutional hostility manifests. However the NCAA acts it must do so in a way that achieves its moral ends but also avoids Penn State litigation that might challenge this extension of power.

NCAA President Mark Emmert point out this is unprecedented and NCAA precedent is not much help. I mean OK, telling a school you can’t go to a bowl game for three years or you lose 25% of your scholarships—these are serious NCAA penalties, yet they feel like a pea-shooters against a whale.
No bowl games? Fewer scholarships?  Versus 35 years of sexual abuse of children under the protective banner or Penn State or ten years of covert denial and cover-up with no remorse?

I know people are screaming for the death penalty, but to what end? The program gained no competitive advantage, violated no major rules, did not abuse student welfare, cheat on exams, not graduate students or play fast and loose with agents. It has no prior history. All the conditions under which the death penalty has been used do not comport. The death penalty would also open the NCAA ups to serious legal challenges which neither it nor Penn State want. 

I want to strongly support another approach that others have floated. Do not use the death penalty. Limit bowls or scholarship reduction if you want, but to act to connect to the moral nature of the crime.

Don’t focus upon retribution. The NCAA should aim for restorative justice.

Take the profits from football for the next five years, or take a high mandated percentage so that other sports will survive. Require Penn State to fund an independent national foundation dedicated to preventative education of child abuse. Put this money to good use. Create a real independent nonprofit foundation and have it dedicated to working with colleges and high school to provide strong education and support to stop this plague.

NCAA action will ultimately rest upon moral claims, not bylaw violations. The NCAA response should be informed by restorative justice, not retribution. Protect future victims from the depredations Penn State fostered.

Friday, July 13, 2012

Penn State: When Coaches are more Powerful than College Presidents

The Penn State scandal continues to unfold with the Freeh Report. The report basically confirms what everyone but true believers knew, Penn State leaders strongly pushed by Head Football Coach Joe Paterno ignored the heinous moral damage to young men done by one of the assistant coaches Jerry Sandusky. More importantly they dithered about the issue, ignored its moral evil and worried more about protecting the reputation of the university and their football program than ending the abuse of children that their own imprimatur made possible.

I have written about this before and most of the clamor at the moment replicates what has already been said. The question of what the NCAA can and should do will also unfold, but I want to address another issue that is not common but also not rare in intercollegiate sports, the role of Presidents in institutional control.

Intercollegiate athletic integrity depends upon Presidential control. The entire reform movement of the last twenty years and all the major increases in student welfare and academic progress has occurred because Presidents asserted control and grabbed it away from athletic directors and coaches. The entire process depends absolutely upon individual university presidents asserting strong control at their own campuses and ensuring both compliance with regulations but also that coaches abide by some reaonsable facsimile of commitment to students as well as athletes.

The Paterno case has reflected for years one of the major cracks in this approach. Under certain conditions coaches become far more powerful than the Presidents of the University. The coaches make more money, they have more visibility, they are treated as celebrity and in many ways they embody the reputation and status of the university. Universities have whole departments devoted to telling stories that prove how their coach embodies the best of the university's values. So we have the reputation machine behind Paterno. But Paterno's power was not alone.

It is now clear that Paterno's own efforts helped paralyze the efforts of Penn State senior administrators to address the issue.

Let's look at some other cases where several factors coalesce:
  • The coach has been very successful at winning games for a long period of time.
  • The coach has lived through several Presidents.
  • The coach has created not just immense support from fans but has cultivated strong relations with very powerful contributors and boosters.
  • The coach has become a symbol of the university and woven into its marketing and reputation.
  • This position means the coach is no longer accountable to anyone in the university hierarchy, only to winning and their own myth.

When these combine coaches amass immense independent power that often puts them beyond the power of the Presidents who feel trapped by boosters, contributors, media and even their boards of regents. Several other examples come to mind among them Bobby Bowden of Florida State,  Bobby Knight at Indiana, Rick Pitino at Louisville among others.

"When the season's over I'll let them know if I want to come back."79 year coach of the Florida State Seminoles Bobby Bowden informed the public who was boss two years ago. He was responding to the demand of the Jim Smith Head of the University's Board of Trustees that "Seminole Nation" had endured his failures "enough." Smith was a little more graphic, it's "sort of like you have to put your favorite dog down; you know its the right thing to do but you sure feel bad about it."

 Another member of the Board commented that she thought this was the business of the University President and Athletic Director--technically true but not likely in modern college athletics. The  University Presidents have largely lost the ability to determine celebrity and long term coach's fates. The Athletic Director and the Board of Trustees have more power but remain as paralyzed.  Just to clarify the Governor of Florida announced that he supported Bowden, considered him one of the greatest coaches of all time and wished him luck for the season. Joe Paterno, at that point another untouchable 82 year old football coach at Penn State, chimed in that Bowden should "decide what he wants to do."

When Rick Pitino decided to have sexual relations in a bar room, the President of Louisville slapped his wrist because the university depended upon its basketball team for whatever reputation it has. Bob Huggins at Cinncinnati ran through several Presidents who were helpless to stop his exploitation of student athletes and violation of rules. It took his own alcohol ruled self destruction to enable a President to get rid of him.

Jerry Tarkenian the basketball coach at UNLV put UNLV on the map. Its basketball team gained the school national presence and prime time visibility despite Tarkenian's blatant disregard for rules and graduating student athletes. At UNLV he got Chancellors fired who tried to fire him. Bobby Knight created an untouchable basketball dynasty at Indiana and the university tolerated and enabled two decades of vile and ruthless and boorish behavior from this paragon who helped cement Indiana's reputation. The phenonon is not common but so powerful that Myles Brand literally made his reputation for firing Bobby Knight as basketball coach at Indiana, but he faced outrage and demonstrations.

Hubris and success coupled with long tenure are ancient recipes for tyranny and tragedy. Men gain such prominence that others fear to remove them. As long as they win or do not do something morally horrendous, these coaches remain untouchable beyond the President's power. An iron triangle of boosters welded to coaches, welded to media welded to donors build unassailable positions that Presidents challenge at their peril.

So university Presidents tolerate or exonerate outlandish behavior like sex on bar tables, drunken driving, academic fraud and personal and public embarrassment. The University Presidents dither for fear of alienating donors, being being assaulted by the media or simply giving up huge marketing and media visibility of celebrity driven winning. The sad paradox of Paterno is that the President had been trying to get rid of him and could not.

The Greek tragedy of hubris and power ends predictably. Woody Hayes at Ohio State assaults a his own player on national TV. Arizona's great and untouchable coach Lute Olsen's  health, team and family life disintegrate while the University shuffled around trying to get him to step down with honor. Penn State has been trying to offer Joe Paterno an honorable way out for a decade, but he continued on impervious to blandishments and invulnerable with his booster, media and support. Now Penn State learns it has harbored moral evil and moral silence at its core values. 

Unable to protect accountability or dignity many Presidents wait for the final incident as in Knight, Hayes, or Huggin's implosions. Paterno represents the same sad pattern.

Often Presidents simply watch and wait for the team to  team lose  cohesion and winning, waiting for the boosters to finally tire and revolt. But by then it's too late. Presidents have ceded power over the program to boosters for the next choice. They set the precedent for Presidential impotence and booster primacy. The cycle will begin again.

I do not want to downplay the moral evil at Penn State, but I do want to highlight that the denouement fits a pattern of unaccountable coaches beyond the reach of presidents. 

A little Presidential courage could avoid the tragedy and support the integrity of athletics.


Sunday, July 1, 2012

The Sandusky Verdict and the Limits of Team Culture



The guilty verdict on Jerry Sandusky for 45 counts of child abuse confirms what we all knew. It also confirms Sandusky’s invincible denial and rationalizations that matches the patterns of most abusers. But Sandusky’s now legally established guilt only reinforces the institutional moral lessons about how dangerous team culture can be to moral integrity.

High achievement in professional fields including sports usually requires successful teams. Sports teams exemplify this reality but it lives in any team at any level of public or private sector. It ranges from the immensity of the Manhattan Project to snow removal. Yet, as Sandusky’s case shows, the dynamics of high achieving teams can lead teams to deny, tolerate or hide immense moral evil in the name of the team.

First, every team produces imbedded authority. At the simplest level members internalize values and commitments to each other. This commitment to each other reinforces and circles back on a commitment to achieve a common purpose. Team members self-censor and do not violate team norms.

Second, internalizing norms proceeds hand in hand with deferring to authority and leaders. Successful sports teams understand that execution depends upon deference to coaches, who recruit team members, socialize them and can cut them for not meeting expectations. In college and high school, the power of coaches to determine the moral and behavioral expectations of players is immense. This is reinforced by the player’s commitments to a common goal.

Teams commit to a mission. This does not require committing to each other, but grows into this on the field and practice. Goal commitment obliges players to get along in practice, the locker room and on the field.
Teammates learn as a matter of course to “live with” the idiosyncrasies and even grossness of other players or coaches. Everyone has idiosyncrasies from the way their sweat smells or how they fart to their behavior off field or dating habits. Players and teammates school themselves to get along with this. They may make jokes about it, but they stuff it for the mission of winning.

These differences can be obvious like race, ethnicity or geography or very personal. It might involve player’s life off field and how they treat partners or their gender preferences. Fellow players will tolerate or simply ignore differences and problems with players who may be jerks or violent or assholes as long as it does not enter the locker room or impact performance. Teammates shrug, “it’s just Manny being Manny,” but they often will not socialize with the idiots.

This goes doubly for coaches and authority figures. The coaches may scream, yell and even abuse players, but they possess huge authority and often grudging respect if they “know their shit.” 

School or club coaches often turn teams into almost family units with care and attention lavished on their players. In college many players were recruited and courted by a coach as well as and developed by a coach.  Even then, on the road players can see coaches misbehaving sometimes, either drinking, womanizing or violating team norms. They may dislike it and resent it, but they will put up with it and keep it silent for the team.

In these tight knit groups, peer authority and identity can be so strong that people can literally miss what they see or reinterpret what they see. Social psychology research is replete with cases where individuals will stifle their own moral initiative under peer pressure or literally realign what they saw to bring into line their perceptions with their beliefs.

This is how Sandusky could get away with his abuse for so long. His actions may seem weird and strange, but if it happens enough, it normalizes his deviance. So bringing along teenage “guests” to practice or road games where the “guests” sleep in his room becomes just “Jerry being Jerry.”

It took a lot of moral courage, maybe all he had, for Mike McQueary to acknowledge to himself that he really did see the coach who recruited and trained him and worked with him raping a young boy in the shower. I imagine his whole body and mind screamed to deny or reinterpret whatever he saw.

But McQueary did see it and fought the temptation to ignore or reinterpret it. He reported it to his revered coach, Joe Paterno, a man who could have ended it all in a microsecond if he had listened or acted. Mike McQueary may not have done enough but he did what most team members cannot do. He reported evil; he snitched; he had the level of self-honesty to see the truth. His testimony at the trial provided independent adult corroboration for the sordid remembrances of the young men who had to dredge up painful and conflicted memories of Sandusky’s embraces.

Penn State is desperately working to eliminate the scandal and rewrite history. The stadium will not be renamed after Paterno, not for lack of trying. The school is tenderly approaching the victims about settlements. They painted out Jerry Sandusky from the famous mural with Penn State players and coaches, rather like 1984. Now they have replaced the blanked out portrait of Sandusky with a leader in the fight against child abuse.

But rewriting history will not be enough here. If new CNN reports are accurate, then the athletic Director Mike Curry and the Vice President Gary Shultz actually planned to report the incident as required by law. But a discussion with Paterno changed the Vice President’s mind. According to CNN, his email stated, he decided to talk to Sandusky and limit his access. "This is a more humane and upfront way to handle this.” They essentially did nothing. Sandusky continued to use Penn State facilities, continued to be free to abuse and continued to use his Penn State status to legitimize his cultivation and grooming of young victims.

One final point, most teams develop a no snitch rule. Not snitching lies deep in any committed group identity; it exists as strongly as “I’ve got your back.” No snitching makes perfect sense because team members do not want to reveal the strategies, skills or training that give a team its identity and strengths. Not snitching prevents opponents from knowing a team’s weaknesses or fissures.

I have watched investigations of teams where a fight had occurred at a party and thirty team members saw the fight. Some tried to break it up, others urged people on, but under investigation no one saw it and no one would reveal a word about not only about who started it but also who fought, period. A wall of denial faced team and department leaders trying to figure it out.  Teams stand together even to hide the bad.

Combine no snitch with the denial and culture of living with the gross stuff, and Sandusky’s actions reveal writ large the horrible mutations that the good of teams can produce.

Friday, November 11, 2011

The Penn State Scandal: How Good Men become Moral Failures

This is very hard to write. I have been associated with intercollegiate athletics for 25 years and served for the last ten years in an official position in the enterprise. I have helped my institution through two major scandals. Always in the turmoil and craziness of this professional world, many of us could look to Penn State as a signal that intercollegiate sports can unite integrity and winning. They had a superb President and fine Athletic Director, and they hired coaches of skill and integrity; they won the right way. At the top of the pyramid with his model permeating the organization stood Joe Paterno who could coach, win, educate and do it without any major scandals. Paterno was not a saint but had become a symbol.

Now one of the beacons of an already stained world has fallen. I know many are writing about this unfolding tragedy so I will confine my discussion to the question of how honorable and good men could fail so profoundly to protect the lives and souls of ten-year old children. As I gaze upon the wreckage from a distance I only feel moral heartsickness for the children whose personhood was invaded and stolen while others watched silently.

We have all heard the story before. An admired and respected figure in an authoritative and hierarchical organization is accused of abuse of power. The members of the organization all know each other and work with each other in intense closeness. They know and trust each other. They have hired and promoted each other from within. They know that one of their own would not abuse their power especially not child molestation. No, this is not my Catholic Church, it is modern collegiate sports.

This problem is not only about child abuse, it is about the moral failure of people who are trustees of institutions. Organizations instinctively cover up abuse that can hurt their reputation and stature. Hospital teams tolerate surgical mistakes, police departments studiously ignore institutional corruption, corporations tolerate dangerous products.

We can say with certainty that as this tragedy unfolds two issues will become clear:
  • 1.     More and more children who were abused by the Assistant Coach and Defensive Coordinator Jerry Sandusky will step forward. A pattern of predation will be revealed that required a pattern of blindness, evasion and willful ignorance from those who worked with him.
  • 2.     It will become evident that more people, assistant coaches, trainers, grad assistants knew or strongly suspected Sandusky's depravity. Football teams and athletic departments are very close worlds. The assistant coaches all know each other’s business including who is having an affair, who has drinking problems and who is skirting rules. Trainers and staff support are all drawn into a tight intimate web of knowledge and mutual support. Nothing stays secret in these worlds.
 College football lives in a we /they world. Teams are built as much upon loyalty as on competence. “I got your back,” is not a meaningless slogan but a reality on the field and in the dog eat dog competitive world of coaching and staffing. Being around folks you can trust and give loyalty defines players, coaches and staff.

This world of loyalty refines and hones its members and replicates itself by hiring and promoting from within. Even outsiders usually come in with personal connections; the world of elite intercollegiate athletics is very small.
This internal world of self-reinforcing loyalty, trust and personal networks is reinforced by the way so many of us lavish our trust and loyalty on these institutions. We identity with them, their leaders and players. This trust and loyalty grant them strength and privilege; in many programs the coaches loom far more powerful than the athletic director or the University President. Penn State epitomized this where Coach Paterno had ignored his athletic director and president’s desire to get him to step down for years.

This is the world that protected Sanduskys’s rape of children. His relation to the Penn State program as a defensive co-ordinator and a regular member of the community continued for 35 years. Even after he retired he had the free run of the facilities. He used his access to bring young boys, the vast majority of them minorities, to the facilities as reward. He gave them presents, many of them from the endless stash of stuff Nike and others bestow on schools. He took them to games and paraded with them at banquets and bowl games. These visits and gifts impressed and groomed the young boys for his exploiting. Many Penn State players performed their public service by working for his charity, The Second Mile, to help underprivileged youth.

So Sandusky used his affiliation and status with the program to seduce the children and as a place to sodomize and fondle and get oral sex from ten year old boys. The janitors saw and knew what was going one. They did not tell anyone out of fear of losing their jobs. They believed that no one would believe them. In the Grand Jury testimony the critical testimony comes from a then 28 year old graduate assistant who saw Sandusky sodomizing a ten or eleven year old in the Penn State shower room. The graduate assistant and now an assistant coach did nothing. He watched and did not intervene. He was shaken, talked to his father and reported it to his head coach Joe Paterno. Then, having discharged his conscience and duty. He then spent the next decade rising in the coaching hierarchy while watching Sandusky come in with children day after day. He did nothing to report or stop it.

The Head Coach claims he only heard about “horsing around” or just fondling and sexual touching. He did nothing. He did his legal responsibility of reporting this to his athletic director and to the Vice President who oversaw the operations. In a clear dereliction of moral responsibility, he did not nothing else. Maybe a slight reprimand, never followed up to stop horsing around. He permitted Sandusky to continue to have access to facilities and to bring children in to them.

The senior administrators knew they had a problem and knew they had an legal obligation to report this activity to the police. They did not. They claimed they took away Sandusky's key to the shower! The athletic director and Senior Vice President admit that they never enforced any prohibition against him. Their own testimony feels self serving and defensive. and basically just thought the graduate assistant was just "uncomfortable." The athletic director and Senior Vice President decided no crime had occurred At least the high school barred him from campus and reported him to the police when they heard an accusation about Sandusky's "inappropriate" conduct. But the University had other interests than protecting children.

The President, one of the best in the country, learned something had happened. How the graduate assistant’s picture of anal sex mutated into fondling and sexual touching and mutated into horsing around is a story in itself. Many organization compress and pare information so that senior leaders often miss the full nature of what goes on. For whatever reasons, President Graham Spanier did not ask the police or his administrators to pursue or look into this.

Several things happen to people under these conditions. First, if they see an immoral action of someone they trust and respect, they literally cannot believe what they see. The mind will often perform surgery and reinterpret what they see into a frame compatible with their respect and trust for the person. So rape becomes fondling, and fondling becomes horsing around. People’s minds will reconfigure the information and their mind will deny what they see. This happens first.

Other pressures augment institutional denial and cloaking. The Grand Jury report provides the grizzly initial narrative but below it lies other mixed motives. People who believe their jobs are on the line will also deny or change their perception. They believe they will not be believed because the trusted respected figure could not be a child molester. So janitors who need the job or graduate assistants, even strapping strong healthy 28 year olds, not only deny what their eyes show them, but rationalize it away to keep their jobs or keep open their upward mobility. This is abetted by the way organizations let people off the hook. A person has the responsibility to report what he saw to a superior and that is enough. The superior is supposed to take care of it. This hierarchy reporting lets people off the hook. They can say to themselves, "I did my duty," even when they fail their moral responsibility.

As rumors spread or people get hints, like watching Sandusky rest his hand on the thigh’s of young men during drives, the men who surround him as friends and colleagues cannot afford to admit what they are seeing. They see him taking ten year olds to banquets or to hotel rooms while on the road and explain it away as his "mentoring." In self-deception a person refuses to draw out the full implications of what they see. These are not stupid people, but they are “friends” with Sandusky. They have gone through the trenches of football combat and the ups and downs of winning and losing. They are bonded by fires of competition and having each other’s back.

If they spell out to themselves that Sandusky, their friend and colleague, abuses children, then they must face themselves. They will be human beings who have as a friend and mentor a moral monster, a man who uses his affiliation with them to recruit, groom and sexually abuse children. To unmask him would expose themselves to moral attack and guilt for their own moral failure of their choice of friend and model.

The intensity of this circle of loyalty and identity is reflected by the fact that these incidents occurred in one of the most homophobic institutions in America. The engraved homophobia at the heart of men’s sport’s culture should have exploded this incident. The fact that colleagues looked the other way not just from child abuse but from the homosexuality hints at how powerful this frame insulated people from seeing or acting upon Sandusky’s actions.

Finally, institutional loyalty and preservation play a role. Officials have obligations to protect and build their institution. The rise of Penn State to national prominence was built upon a solid foundation of athletic accomplishments, but the emotional driver and symbolic lodestone had been the football program, and the football program was Joe Paterno. Any threat to athletics threatened 25 years of building the university. An athletic director, a vice president and a president all have obligations to build and protect their institution. The reporting process, the discomfort of people to face the moral truth of a person they know and might admire combine to invite people to self-deception. The culture that limits responsibility to reporting to a superior makes it all the morally convenient. People can avoid being responsible to take action or even report to the police to stop the evil they saw. This legalism releases them from responsibility and falls apart if the superiors fail in their own moral stewardship.

It is too easy to deny or hide abuse. It happens in marriages where wives protect husbands who abuse children; it certainly can happen at a university. These men knew to act publically might bring dishonor and disgrace upon the athletic program and person who personified the Penn State brand. When push came to shove, the leaders found the language and the rationalizations to downplay immorality that could tarnish or scandalize the university and the football program that symbolized and contributed to its rise.

The failure here is profound and simple. Any one of these men could have stopped the evil. Instead they were morally lazy. They settled for benign interpretations that excused them facing the brutal facts and making hard decisions. All they had to do was report it to the police; all they had to do was obey the law even if they washed their own hands. All they had to do stop Sandusky’s access. 

They did not.

They all deserve to be fired for moral dereliction.

We are not talking about dishonorable or bad men. That is the horror and lesson. This collective moral blindness can happen at any institutions to whom we give trust and who live by loyalty, “got my back” and competence. But they failed. They refused to see what was before their eyes. They refused to risk friendship or self-worth or their own institution’s reputation to protect innocent children.

In this they mirror of our frailty and remind us of own willingness to vest our own loyalty without accountability. Our own credulity gave them the warrant to continue their own moral blindness.